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Abstract
We present an empirical model of earnings that controls for observable and unobservable
characteristics of workers (person e¤ects), unmeasured characteristics of their employers (rm
e¤ects), and unmeasured characteristics of worker-rmmatches (match e¤ects). We interpret
these as the returns to general human capital, rm-specic human capital, and match-specic
human capital, respectively. We stress the importance of match e¤ects because the returns
to match-specic human capital will be incorrectly attributed to general and/or rm-specic
human capital when match e¤ects are omitted, and because general and specic human
capital have very di¤erent implications for the economic cost of job destruction. We nd that
slightly more than half of observed variation in log earnings is attributable to general human
capital, 22 percent is attributable to rm-specic human capital, and 16 percent to match-
specic human capital. Specications that omit match e¤ects over-estimate the returns to
experience by as much as 50 percent, over-estimate the returns to a college education by
as much as 8 percent, attribute too much variation to person e¤ects, and too little to rm
e¤ects. Our results suggest that considerable earnings variation previously attributed to
general human capital both observed and unobserved is in fact attributable to workers
sorting into higher-paying rms and better worker-rm matches.
JEL Classication: C23, J21
Keywords: xed e¤ects, mixed e¤ects, person and rm e¤ects, human capital, linked
employer-employee data
1 Introduction
It is well known that observable characteristics of workers and rms explain little of the ob-
served variation in employment earnings. One possible explanation is that unexplained wage
dispersion reects unmeasured productivity di¤erences across workers, rms, and worker-rm
matches. Theory suggests several possibilities for the source of these productivity di¤er-
ences. Human capital theory (Becker, 1964) suggests both general human capital (which is
transferable between employers) and specic human capital (which is not transferable) are
potentially important. Matching models further emphasize the importance of match-specic
human capital in determining wages and employment mobility. In reality, general human
capital, rm-specic human capital, and match-specic human capital are all potentially
important determinants of labor earnings. The distinction between general and specic hu-
man capital is important because they have di¤erent implications for the cost of employment
re-allocation over the business cycle. To date, however, empirical attempts to distinguish
between them have been hampered by data limitations. It is only with the recent advent
of longitudinal linked data on employers and employees that we can credibly hope to iden-
tify the separate contribution of general, rm-specic, and match-specic human capital to
earnings variation.
We present an empirical model of earnings that controls for observable and unobservable
characteristics of workers (person e¤ects), unmeasured characteristics of their employers
(rm e¤ects), and unmeasured characteristics of worker-rm matches (match e¤ects). We
call this the match e¤ects model. It allows us, for the rst time, to measure the relative
importance of general human capital, rm-specic human capital, and match-specic human
capital in labor earnings. Using the US Census Bureaus Longitudinal Employer-Household
Dynamics database, we nd that over half of observed variation in log earnings is attributable
to general human capital, 22 percent is attributable to rm-specic human capital, and 16
percent to match-specic human capital.
Most recent empirical work using linked employer-employee data has focused on an em-
pirical model of earnings that controls for person and rm e¤ects (Abowd et. al., 1999,
AKM hereafter). The match e¤ects model generalizes the person and rm e¤ects model by
introducing an interaction between worker and rm, which we call the match e¤ect. The
match e¤ect has a straightforward interpretation. It measures persistent within-match dif-
ferences in log earnings between two workers who possess the same level of general human
capital (i.e., share the same measured and unmeasured characteristics) and the same level
of rm-specic human capital (i.e., are employed in otherwise identical rms). We interpret
this as the value of match-specic human capital, both productive (e.g., match-specic skills,
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or match quality) and unproductive (e.g., accumulated knowledge about match quality as
in Jovanovic (1979) and other learning models).
Although the match e¤ects model seems a straightforward generalization of the person
and rm e¤ects model, it makes two important contributions. The rst contribution is to
decompose earnings variation into person, rm, and match-specic components. This decom-
position is of substantive economic interest because general, rm-specic, and match-specic
human capital have di¤erent implications for the cost of employment re-allocation over the
business cycle. Consider the termination of an employment relationship. Match-specic
human capital accumulated over the course of the employment relationship is permanently
destroyed when the worker and rm separate. Its value is lost both to match participants
and to society as a whole. Firm-specic human capital is also destroyed. However, it is
replaceable (at some cost) because the rm can hire and train a new worker to have the
same skills. In contrast, general human capital is fully transferable. It is returned to service
when the worker nds new employment, so that the income it generates is only lost for the
period of unemployment. Because of these di¤erences, knowing the relative importance of
general and specic human capital can usefully inform labor market policy. For instance, it
can illuminate the relative value of subsidizing general training versus on-the-job training in
specic skills or subsidizing job search.
The second contribution of the match e¤ects model is to correct potential biases in the
person and rm e¤ects model. The person and rm e¤ects model has proved very useful for
measuring the returns to general versus rm-specic human capital (see, e.g., Abowd et al.
(2003) for an application). However, its usefulness is limited if it yields biased estimates of
quantities of interest. We nd evidence that it does.
There are two related ways to conceptualize this bias. The rst is a standard omitted
variable bias. Omitted match e¤ects will bias the estimated coe¢ cients of observable char-
acteristics that are correlated with the match e¤ect. This will manifest itself, for example, if
workers with some characteristics are more successful at nding good worker-rm matches
than others. We nd considerable evidence of this bias for standard measures of general hu-
man capital, e.g., labor market experience and education. We nd that the person and rm
e¤ects model over-estimates the returns to 25 years of experience by as much as 50 percent
for men and 37 percent for women. Likewise, it over-estimates the returns to a college degree
by about 6 percent for men and 8 percent for women. Our results suggest that much of the
returns traditionally associated with the accumulation of general human capital are in fact
attributable to the accumulation of match-specic human capital. A potential explanation
is that workers sort into increasingly good matches over the course of their career, and that
more educated workers sort into better employment matches than less educated workers. We
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nd corroborating evidence in the determinants of earnings growth when individuals change
employers.
We obtain an even stronger result for the omitted variable bias in estimated person
and rm e¤ects. In general, the estimated person and rm e¤ects are unbiased only if the
excluded match e¤ects are all zero. We nd substantial evidence to the contrary. In fact,
we easily reject the hypothesis of no match e¤ects. As a consequence, the person and rm
e¤ects model substantially overestimates the proportion of variation attributable to person
e¤ects, and underestimates the proportion of attributable to rm e¤ects.
There is a second way to conceptualize bias in the person and rm e¤ects model. An
identifying assumption of this model is that employment mobility is conditionally exogenous
given observable characteristics and the person and rm e¤ects. All parameter estimates
are potentially biased if the exogenous mobility assumption is violated. This would be the
case, for instance, if a worker and rm separate due to a badmatch. Introducing the
match e¤ect adds an additional dimension on which to condition the exogenous mobility
assumption: unmeasured characteristics of worker-rm matches, including match quality.
We examine the sources of earnings growth when individuals change employers, and nd
evidence that the person and rm e¤ects model violates the exogenous mobility assumption
but that the match e¤ects model does not.
Although the match e¤ects model is conceptually straightforward, estimating it is not.
In choosing an estimator, we have two objectives: correcting the bias due to omitted match
e¤ects, and obtaining a meaningful decomposition of wage variation into person, rm, and
match-specic components. We consider both xed and mixed e¤ect estimators of the match
e¤ects model. These provide similar results for the bias correction, but quite di¤erent results
for the variance decomposition.
The xed e¤ect estimator provides an easily computed bias correction based on ordinary
least squares. However, separately identifying the person, rm, and match e¤ects using
this estimator requires ancillary identifying assumptions. Intuitively, these are required
to distinguish good workers and rms (i.e., those with large person/rm e¤ects) from
lucky ones (i.e., those with large match e¤ects). As a consequence, interpreting xed
e¤ect estimates of the variance decomposition and even the person, rm, and match e¤ects
themselves is open to the choice of ancillary assumptions. We consider several possibilities,
none of which is wholly satisfactory.
Because of these problems of identication and interpretation, we prefer a mixed e¤ect
estimator that treats the person, rm, and match e¤ects as random. This approach yields
a straightforward bias correction based on generalized least squares, and identication does
not require ancillary assumptions. Instead, it relies on conditional moment restrictions on
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the random e¤ects. In addition to a traditional mixed e¤ect estimator, we also present a
novel hybridestimator based on a combination of xed e¤ect and mixed e¤ect identifying
assumptions. The hybrid estimator allows arbitrary correlation between time-varying ob-
servable characteristics and the random e¤ects. It is thus in the spirit of the Hausman and
Taylor (1981) correlated random e¤ects estimator.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. To provide some context, we briey
review the person and rm e¤ects model and formalize the exogenous mobility assumption
in Section 2. In Section 3, we derive the bias due to omitted match e¤ects, and develop our
estimators of the match e¤ects model. Section 4 describes the data used in the empirical
application, and Section 5 presents the estimation results. We conclude with some brief
remarks in Section 6.
2 The Person and Firm E¤ects Model
To make ideas concrete, it is helpful to review the person and rm e¤ects model. The basic
specication is
yijt = + x
0
ijt + i +  j + "ijt (1)
where yijt is a measure of log compensation for worker i at rm j in period t;  is the grand
mean; xijt is a vector of time-varying observable characteristics that earn returns ; i is the
person e¤ect;  j is the rm e¤ect; and "ijt is stochastic error. The portable component of
compensation, i.e., the returns to individual characteristics plus the person e¤ect, is usually
interpreted as measuring the value of general human capital. The rm e¤ect is usually
interpreted as a measure of rm-specic human capital.1
Several estimators have been proposed for the person and rm e¤ects model. AKM
develop approximate solutions for least squares (xed e¤ect) estimates. Abowd et al. (2002,
ACK hereafter) present exact least squares solutions, estimated via a conjugate gradient
algorithm. Woodcock (2005a) presents a mixed e¤ect estimator, of which the least squares
estimator is a special case.
1See Woodcock (2005a) for an equilibrium matching model that yields this interpretation of the person
and rm e¤ects. In general, the person e¤ect will measure persistent di¤erences in compensation between
individuals, conditional on observable characteristics and rm e¤ects. Likewise, the rm e¤ect will measure
persistent di¤erences in compensation across rms, conditional on measured and unmeasured characteristics
of workers. These persistent di¤erences in compensation could arise for reasons other than productivity
di¤erences. For instance, the person e¤ect could reect the workers skill in negotiating compensation.
Likewise, compensation may vary across rms because of product market conditions, monopsony power,
compensating di¤erentials for non-pecuniary aspects of the job, or rm-specic compensation policies. With
this caveat in mind, and without any way to identify these alternate interpretations from the data, we
interpret person and rm e¤ects as general and rm-specic human capital, respectively.
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Each of these estimators depends critically on employment mobility to identify the var-
ious e¤ects. The person e¤ect measures the component of earnings that is common to all
of an individuals employment spells (i.e., portable), and that is not due to observable char-
acteristics. Identifying this e¤ect therefore requires repeated observations on the individual
at di¤erent employers. Likewise, the rm e¤ect measures the component of earnings that is
common to all employees of the rm, and that is distinct from variation due to xijt and the
person e¤ects. Thus identifying the rm e¤ect requires observations on multiple employees
of the rm. Identifying both e¤ects requires mobility of workers between rms.
To obtain unbiased estimates of the various e¤ects, however, requires more. Specically,
the identity of the rm j at which worker i is employed in period t; which we represent by the
function j = J (i; t), must be unrelated to omitted determinants of earnings, i.e., unrelated
to statistical error "ijt. Consequently, when workers change employers, so that J (i; t) 6=
J (i; t+ 1), this must also be unrelated to "iJ (i;t)t and "iJ (i;t+1)t+1. These requirements are
neatly summarized by the standard assumption that errors have zero conditional mean:
E ["ijtji; j; t; xijt] = 0 (2)
and note that we condition on j = J (i; t). In the context of the person and rm e¤ects
model, assumption (2) has become known as the exogenous mobility assumption. It requires
that employment mobility depend only on observable characteristics, the person e¤ect, and
the rm e¤ect, and precludes mobility determined by omitted factors ("ijt).
There are a number of empirically relevant situations where actual employment mobility
may violate the exogenous mobility assumption.2 The match e¤ects model addresses one such
situation: where employment mobility depends on unobserved match-specic components of
wages. In fact, we argue that exogenous mobility will be violated if productivity depends
in any meaningful way on match-specic human capital. The argument is simple. Suppose
productivity depends on match-specic human capital. If workers capture any of its returns,
then earnings also depend on match-specic human capital. If match-specic human capital
is not directly observable, its inuence on labor earnings will be absorbed into the error term.
When employment mobility depends on wages,3 it consequently depends on unobserved
match-specic human capital. This violates the exogenous mobility assumption.
For those readers who are not convinced by a verbal argument, we present a formal
2Gruetter and Lalive (2004) estimate the person and rm e¤ects model on a sample of job-to-job employ-
ment transitions, where mobility is arguably endogenous, and a sample of job-unemployment-job transitions,
where mobility is arguably exogenous, and nd substantial di¤erences.
3Empirical evidence on the relationship between wages and mobility dates to the advent on longitudinal
data (if not earlier), e.g., Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) and Bartel and Borjas (1981). Dostie (2005) provides
more recent evidence.
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one in Appendix A. There, we develop a simple two-period model of wage bargaining with
on-the-job search. Under rudimentary assumptions, wages and mobility jointly depend on
productivity. The implication is that when productivity depends on match-specic human
capital, so too do wages and mobility.
3 The Match E¤ects Model
We consider the empirical specication
yijt = + x
0
ijt + i +  j + ij + "ijt (3)
where ij is a match e¤ect and all other terms are as dened in Section 2. From a statistical
perspective, the match e¤ect has a simple interpretation: it is the interaction e¤ect between
worker and rm. Its economic interpretation is also straightforward. The match e¤ect
measures the returns to unobserved time-invariant characteristics of worker-rm matches,
which we interpret as the return to match-specic human capital.4 Note these returns are
distinct from returns to unmeasured individual and rm characteristics.
We further decompose the person e¤ect i into components observed and unobserved by
the econometrician:
i = i + u
0
i (4)
where ui is a vector of time-invariant observable individual characteristics,  measures returns
to those characteristics, and i is the unobservable component. The rm and match e¤ects
can be similarly decomposed, but we do not consider that case here.
As in the case of the person and rm e¤ects model, identication requires assumptions
about the error distribution. We continue to assume that errors have zero conditional mean:
E ["ijtji; j; t; xijt] = 0 (5)
which simply restates the exogenous mobility assumption. Note, however, that introducing
the match e¤ect in (3) fundamentally changes the interpretation of this assumption. Speci-
cally, mobility based on unobserved characteristics of worker-rm matches no longer violates
exogenous mobility. That is, (5) now requires that employment mobility depend only on
observable characteristics, the person e¤ect, the rm e¤ect, and the match e¤ect.5
4Another possible interpretation is that the match e¤ect measures the value of production complemen-
tarities between the worker and rm. This has essentially the same implications for its predicted impact on
wages and mobility.
5Of course, introducing the match e¤ect only makes the exogenous mobility assumption robust to mobility
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In addition to the zero conditional mean assumption, we assume errors are spherical:
E ["ijt"mnsji; j; t;m; n; s; xijt; xmns] =
(
2" for i = m; j = n; t = s
0 otherwise.
(6)
These assumptions can be relaxed, but doing so complicates estimation. See Woodcock
(2005a) for an application of the person and rm e¤ects model with non-spherical errors.
Let N denote the total number of observations; N is the number of individuals; J is
the number of rms; M  NJ is the number of worker-rm employment matches; k is
the number of time-varying covariates; and q is the number of time-invariant observable
individual characteristics. We can rewrite the match e¤ects model in matrix notation:
y = +X +D + F +G+ " (7)
 = + U (8)
where y is the N  1 vector of log compensation;  is now the N  1 mean vector; X
is the N  k matrix of time-varying covariates;  is a k  1 parameter vector; D is the
N  N design matrix of the person e¤ects;  is the N  1 vector of person e¤ects; F is
the N  J design matrix of the rm e¤ects;  is the J  1 vector of rm e¤ects; G is the
N M design matrix of the match e¤ects;  is the M  1 vector of match e¤ects;  is
the N  1 vector of unobserved components of the person e¤ect; U is the N  q matrix of
time-invariant individual characteristics;  is a q  1 parameter vector; and " is the N  1
error vector. There is a simple relationship between D;F , and G: Specically, the column
of G corresponding to the match between worker i and rm j, which we call column ij, is
the elementwise product of the ith column of D and the jth column of F:
Identication and estimation of the various e¤ects is nontrivial. Before turning to these
matters, however, we rst derive the bias that arises from omitting match e¤ects. In doing so,
we focus on the xed e¤ect estimator of the person and rm e¤ects model because virtually
all prior research is based on this specication.
3.1 Omitted Match E¤ects
When the data generating process is given by equation (3) but the estimated equation
excludes the match e¤ect ij; the estimated parameters 
; i ; and  

j are biased. Specically,
decisions based on time-invariant unobserved characteristics of worker-rm matches. It is plausible that time-
varying characteristics (e.g., the accumulation of match-specic human capital) also matter. In principle,
this could be accomodated via a tenure e¤ect. However, to enable a straightforward comparison between the
match e¤ects model and the person and rm e¤ects model, we defer such considerations for future research.
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least squares estimates of the mis-specied model satisfy
E [] =  +
 
X 0M[D F ]X
 1
X 0M[D F ]G
E [] =  +
 
D0M[X F ]D
 
D0M[X F ]G
E [ ] =  +
 
F 0M[X D]F
 
F 0M[X D]G (9)
where A  denotes a generalized inverse of A,6 and MA  I  A (A0A) A0 projects onto the
column null space of A:
In expectation, the estimated returns to observable characteristics, , equal the true
vector of returns plus an employment-duration weighted average of the match e¤ects in the
individuals employment history, conditional on the design of the person and rm e¤ects.
The sign and magnitude of the bias depends on the conditional covariance between X and
G; given D and F:
The expected value of the estimated person e¤ects in the mis-specied model, , equal
the true vector of person e¤ects plus the employment-duration weighted average of match
e¤ects in the workers employment history, conditional on observable time-varying character-
istics and rm e¤ects. Because of the simple relationship between D;F; and G noted above,
in general D0M[X F ]G = 0 only if  = 0. In fact, in the simplest case where X and F are
orthogonal to D and G, so that D0M[X F ]D = D0D and D0M[X F ]G = D0G, the omitted
variable bias is a vector of employment duration-weighted average match e¤ects,7 so that
E [i ]  i =
1
Ti
TiX
t=t1i
iJ (i;t) (10)
where we denote the periods that person i appears in the sample by t1i ; t
2
i ; :::; Ti.
8
In similar fashion, the omitted variable bias in   is zero only when F 0M[X D]G = 0;
which again requires  = 0 in general. If X and D are orthogonal to F and G; so that
F 0M[X D]F = F 0F and F 0M[X D]G = F 0G; the omitted variable bias in  
 is a vector of
6For simplicity, we assume X has full column rank k: However D;F; and G do not, in general, have full
column rank without additional identifying restrictions, e.g., exclusion of one column per connected group
of workers and rms. See Searle (1987, Ch. 5) for a general statistical discussion of connected data, or ACK
for a discussion in the context of linked employer-employee data.
7D0G is an N M matrix whose entry in row i and column ij is the duration of the match between
worker i and rm j:
8We implicitly assume each worker has only one employer per period. The extension to multiple employers
per period is straightforward, but complicates notation.
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employment duration-weighted average match e¤ects,9 so that
E

 j
   j = 1Nj X
i2Ij
TiX
t=t1i
iJ (i;t) (11)
where we use Ij = fi : J (i; t) = j for some tg to denote the set of all employees of rm j,
Nj =
PN
i=1
PTi
t=t1i
1 (J (i; t) = j) is the total number of observations on rm j; and 1 (A) is
the indicator function that takes value one when A is true and zero otherwise.
The preceding illustrates that if match e¤ects are nonzero, the person and rm e¤ects
model will attribute variation to person and rm e¤ects that is actually due to omitted match
e¤ects. The returns to observable characteristics will also be biased if workers with certain
characteristics (e.g., more education or experience) sort into better employment matches
than others.
3.2 Fixed E¤ect Estimators
Economists often prefer xed e¤ect estimators to mixed (random) e¤ect estimators because
they are perceived to embody fewer assumptions about the relationship between observables
and unobservables. Indeed, almost all estimates of the person and rm e¤ects model are
based on the xed e¤ect estimator, so we begin here.
Estimating  is straightforward and requires no further assumptions. Applying standard
results for partitioned regression, the least squares estimator of  is:
^ =
 
X 0M[D F G]X
 1
X 0M[D F G]y: (12)
Some algebra veries thatM[D F G] takes deviations from match-specic means.10 So we can
recover ^ from the regression of yijt on xijt, both in deviations from match-specic means:
yijt   yij = (xijt   xij)0  + ijt (13)
where yij = 1Tij
PTi
t=t1i
1 (J (i; t) = j) yiJ (i;t)t, xij = 1Tij
PTi
t=t1i
1 (J (i; t) = j)xiJ (i;t)t; and ijt
9F 0G is a JM matrix whose entry in row j and columnn ij is the duration of the match between worker
i and rm j:
10M[D F G] projects onto the column null space of [D F G] : It is a block diagonal matrix with N rows
and columns, where the M diagonal blocks correspond to each of the M worker-rm matches. The ijth
diagonal block is zero if worker i never works at rm j: Otherwise, it is the Tij  Tij submatrix M ij[D F G] =
ITij   1Tij Tij 0Tijwhere Tij =
PTi
t=t1i
1 (J (i; t) = j) is the duration of the match between worker i and rm
j; IA is the identity matrix of order A; and A is an A  1 vector of ones. Each M ij[D F G] takes deviations
from means in the match between worker i and rm j:
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is statistical error. Note this simple method to recover the least squares estimate of  is only
valid when the model includes match e¤ects.11
3.2.1 Identifying the Person, Firm, and Match E¤ects
Separately identifying the person, rm, and match e¤ects is less trivial than estimating .
At its core, the identication problem is to distinguish goodworkers and rms (i.e., those
with larger person/rm e¤ects) from luckyones (i.e., those with large match e¤ects). In
the case of the xed e¤ect estimator, this is complicated by the sheer number of parameters
to estimate (k elements of ; N person e¤ects, J rm e¤ects, M match e¤ects, and the
intercept).12 Beyond this, however, there is a fundamental identication problem: the xed
e¤ect formulation of the match e¤ects model is over-parameterized. There are N+J+M+1
person e¤ects, rm e¤ects, match e¤ects, and a constant term to estimate, but only M
worker-rm matches (cell means) from which to estimate them.13 Alternately put, the
only estimable functions of i;  j; ij and  in equation (3) are the M population cell means
ij = + i +  j + ij (Searle, 1987 p. 331).
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To see the identication problem, note that with ^ in hand, the least squares estimator
of i;  j; ij and  solves the remaining normal equations from the partitioned regression.
This is equivalent to regressing y X^ on D; F; G, and an intercept. Predicted values from
this regression are the N 1 vector  I  M[D F G]y  X^ = ^+D^+F ^+G^: There
are only M distinct elements in the vector of predicted values, the sample cell means
ij =
1
Tij
TiX
t=t1i

yijt   x0ijt^

= ^+ ^i +  ^j + ^ij: (14)
And yet we are tasked with decomposing the M sample cell means into N + J +M + 1
parameters. This requires ancillary assumptions.
One solution is to impose linear restrictions on the estimated coe¢ cients. A candidate
11That is, whereas M[D F G] takes deviations from match match-specic means, M[D F ] does not.
12The typical application involves millions of workers and matches, and hundreds of thousands of rms.
13The term cell mean is adopted from the statisical literature on estimation of the two-way crossed
classication with interaction, of which the match e¤ects model is an example. It arises from representing
the data as a table with rows dened by the levels of i (workers), and columns dened by the levels of j
(rms). The entry in row i and column j is the mean earnings of worker i at rm j:
14In practice, there are only M estimable functions of the person, rm, and match e¤ects, the overall
constant, and a set of group means. The group means are dened for connected groups of observations
in the sample. When the sample consists of G connected groups of observations, the number of estimable
functions of the other e¤ects is reduced by a corresponding amount. For clarity of exposition, I asbtract
from these considerations in the main text, and presume the sample consists of a single connected group.
See ACK for further discussion of connectedness, including a graph-theoretic algorithm for determining
connected groups of observations and identication conditions in the person and rm e¤ect model.
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collection of restrictions is
NX
i=1
^i = 0;
JX
j=1
 ^j = 0;
NX
i=1
^ij = 0 8j; and
JX
j=1
^ij = 0 8i: (15)
These simply normalize the person and rm e¤ects to have zero mean, and the match e¤ects
to have zero mean for each person and rm.15 We use an algorithm suggested by Searle
(1987, pp. 328-332) to solve (14) and (15). We do not, however, report the results because
the estimates are di¢ cult to interpret.16 Notably, we would like to be able to compare match
e¤ects across workers or rms. However the restrictions (15) preclude any such comparison
because match e¤ects are measured relative to person and rm-specic means. This inter-
pretability problem is not due to the linear restrictions (15) per se. Any other other collection
of linear restrictions will rule out some types of meaningful comparisons.
More importantly, however, least squares estimates of the match e¤ects model rule out
interpersonal comparisons of person e¤ects and interrm comparisons of rm e¤ects. This
is because only the cell means are estimable, and hence the only estimable linear contrasts
are those involving the cell means. For example, in the case of two employees i and m of
rm j; the linear contrast
ij   mj =
 
+ i +  j + ij
   + m +  j + mj = (i   m) +  ij   mj (16)
is estimable. However, linear constrasts like i   m and  j    n (for i 6= m and j 6= n) are
not estimable in this framework because there is no way to eliminate match e¤ects from (16).
Of course these contrasts are estimable in the person and rm e¤ects model. Consequently,
terms such as high wage workersand high wage rmsare meaningful in the person and
rm e¤ects model, but meaningless in least squares estimates of the match e¤ects model.
Because of these interpretability problems, we take a di¤erent approach. We dene
the match e¤ects to be orthogonal to person and rm e¤ects. This permits meaningful
comparison of the person, rm, and match e¤ects across workers and rms. In fact, the
match e¤ect is identied whenever the corresponding person and rm e¤ects are identied
in the model without match e¤ects. We can therefore base identication on conditions
developed by ACK for the person and rm e¤ect model. We can also use the ACK conjugate
gradient algorithm to decompose the cell means into least squares estimates of the intercept,
the person e¤ect, the rm e¤ect, and an orthogonal match e¤ect, as follows.
15These restrictions require slight modication when the data consist of G connected groups of workers
and rms. In particular, we need to normalize the person and rm e¤ects to have zero mean in each group,
as well as zero overall mean.
16These results are available on request.
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Let  denote the N1 vector of cell means (14). The orthogonal match e¤ect estimator
is dened by the least squares regression of  on an intercept, D, and F: The implied estimate
of the intercept, ^; is the sample mean of the cell means: ^ = 1
N
P
ij, and the estimated
person and rm e¤ects solve"
D0D D0F
F 0D F 0F
#  "
^
 ^
#
=
"
D0
F 0
#
(   ^) (17)
subject to the grouping conditions of ACK.17 The least squares estimator of the orthogonal
match e¤ect is ^ = M[D F ] (   ^) =    ^   D^   F ^, which is just the residual in the
regression of  on D;F; and an intercept.
Given the estimated e¤ects, there remains to decompose the person e¤ect into its ob-
servable and unobservable components as in (4). This is straightforward. We estimate the
least squares regression of ^i on observable characteristics ui. Residuals from this regression
dene an estimator of the unobserved component i that is orthogonal to ui:
3.3 Mixed E¤ect Estimators
An alternative identication strategy is to assume the person, rm, and match e¤ects are
random. In this case, identication relies on restrictions on the conditional moments of the
random e¤ects. These are like Bayes prior information on the distribution of the random
e¤ects (see Searle et al. (1992) for a Bayesian interpretation of the mixed e¤ect estimator).18
We consider two mixed (random) e¤ect estimators. Both treat  and  as xed, and ;  ;
and  as random. To facilitate comparison with prior research, we estimate mixed models
with and without match e¤ects.
17ACK derive necessary and su¢ cient conditions to identify ^ and  ^ in the person and rm e¤ects model.
They are only identied up to a group mean in each group of connected workers and rms. Hence a su¢ cient
condition for identication of ^ and  ^ is
P
i2g ^i = 0 and
P
j2g  ^j = 0 in each group g:
18There is another di¤erence between xed and mixed e¤ect identication when the data consist of G > 1
connected groups of observations. The mixed e¤ects estimator spreads identication across all groups. Fixed
e¤ect estimates of the person, rm, and match e¤ects are only identied within a connected group, i.e., they
are measured relative to G group means and an overall mean. This implies that at most M   G   1 xed
e¤ect estimates of person, rm, and match e¤ects are identied. In contrast, all N + J +M random person,
rm, and match e¤ects are identied, though each e¤ect is normalized to have zero conditional mean.
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The rst estimator is a traditional mixed model based on the moment conditions
E [ijxijt; ui] = E

 jjxijt; ui

= E

ijjxijt; ui

= 0 (18)
Cov
264 i j
ij
 xijt; ui
375 =
264 
2
 0 0
0 2 0
0 0 2
375 : (19)
Estimation follows a Feasible GLS strategy. We rst estimate the variance components 
2; 
2
 ; 
2


and the error variance 2" by Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML).
19 REML
is often described as maximizing the part of the likelihood that is invariant to the values of the
xed e¤ects and is akin to partitioned regression.20 The REML estimator has many attractive
properties: estimates are invariant to the value of  and , consistent, asymptotically normal,
and asymptotically e¢ cient in the Cramer-Rao sense.
We estimate , ; and the realized random e¤ects in a second stage. Given the moment
conditions (18) and (19), the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE) of the xed e¤ect
and Best Linear Unbiased Predictor (BLUP) of the random e¤ects solve the Henderson
et al. (1959) mixed model equations.21 In the match e¤ects model, these are26666664
X 0X X 0U X 0D X 0F X 0G
U 0X U 0U U 0D U 0F U 0G
D0X D0U D0D +
 
~2"=~
2


IN D
0F D0G
F 0X F 0U F 0D F 0F +
 
~2"=~
2
 

IJ F
0G
G0X G0U G0D G0F G0G+
 
~2"=~
2


IM
37777775
26666664
~
~
~
~ 
~
37777775 =
26666664
X 0y
U 0y
D0y
F 0y
G0y
37777775
(20)
where
 
~2"; ~
2
; ~
2
 ; ~
2


are REML estimates and

~; ~; ~; ~ ; ~

denote solutions for the vari-
ous e¤ects. As
 
~2; ~
2
 ; ~
2

!1; the mixed model equations converge to the least squares
normal equations solved by the xed e¤ect estimator. In this sense, the least squares esti-
mator is a special case of the mixed e¤ect estimator.
We also estimate a novel hybridmixed e¤ect estimator that combines identication
conditions of the traditional mixed and xed e¤ect estimators. The main advantage of this
approach is that it relaxes the zero-conditional-mean assumption (18). It is in the spirit of
19We compute REML estimates using the Average Information (AI) algorithm of Gilmour et al. (1995).
20Formally, REML is maximum likelihood on linear combinations of y under the assumption of normally
distributed errors. The linear combinations K 0y are chosen so that K 0 (X + U) = 0 for all values of  and
; which implies K 0 [X U ] = 0: Thus K 0 projects onto the column null space of [X U ] and is of the form
K 0 = C 0M[X U ] for arbitrary C 0:
21The BLUPs ~; ~ ; and ~ are best in the sense of minimizing the mean square error of prediction among
linear unbiased estimators, and unbiased in the sense E [~] = E [], E
h
~ 
i
= E [ ], and E
h
~
i
= E [] : See
Robinson (1991) for details.
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the Hausman and Taylor (1981) correlated random e¤ects estimator. Estimation proceeds
in three stages. In the rst stage, we estimate  under the identifying assumptions of the
xed e¤ect model, so that ^ is given by the withinestimator (12). In the second stage,
we estimate the variance components and error variance via REML on the gross residuals
yijt   x0ijt^. The implied conditional moment restrictions are now:
E [ijui] = E

 jjui

= E

ijjui

= 0 (21)
Cov
264 i j
ij
 ; ui
375 =
264 
2
 0 0
0 2 0
0 0 2
375 : (22)
Note that unlike (18) and (19), the moment restrictions (21) and (22) no longer condition
on xijt: This allows correlation between xijt and the person, rm, and match e¤ects. In the
third stage we solve the mixed model equations:266664
U 0U U 0D U 0F U 0G
D0U D0D +
 
~2"=~
2


IN D
0F D0G
F 0U F 0D F 0F +
 
~2"=~
2
 

IJ F
0G
G0U G0D G0F G0G+
 
~2"=~
2


IM
377775
266664


 

377775 =
266664
U 0
D0
F 0
G0
377775

y  X^

:
(23)
for ; ;  ; and :
The hybrid mixed e¤ect estimator has the following properties. ^ is the BLUE of  given
the minimal assumptions (5) and (6) on ": Given the additional stochastic assumptions (21)
and (22),  is the BLUE of  and
 
;  ; 

are BLUPs of the random e¤ects.
4 Data
Identifying the person, rm, and match e¤ects requires longitudinal data on employers and
employees. We use data from the US Census Bureaus Longitudinal Employer-Household
Dynamics (LEHD) database. These data span thirty-two states that represent the majority
of American employment. We use data from two participating states, whose identity is
condential.
The LEHD data are administrative, constructed from Unemployment Insurance (UI)
system employment reports. These are collected by each states Employment Security agency
to manage the unemployment compensation program. Employers are required to report total
payments to all employees on a quarterly basis. These payments (earnings) include gross
wages and salary, bonuses, stock options, tips and gratuities, and the value of meals and
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lodging when these are supplied (Bureau of Labor Statistics (1997, p. 44)).
The coverage of UI data varies slightly from state to state, though the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (1997, p. 42) claims that UI coverage is broad and basically comparable from
state to stateand that over 96 percent of total wage and salary civilian jobswere covered
in 1994. See Stevens (2002) and Abowd et al. (2006) for further details. With the UI
employment records as its frame, the LEHD data comprise the universe of employment at
rms required to le UI reports  that is, all employment potentially covered by the UI
system in participating states.
Individuals are uniquely identied in the data by a Protected Identity Key (PIK). Em-
ployers are identied by an unemployment insurance account number (SEIN). The UI em-
ployment records contain only limited information: PIK, SEIN, and earnings. The LEHD
database integrates these with internal Census Bureau data to obtain additional demographic
and rm characteristics, including sex, race, date of birth, industry, and geography.
Though the underlying data are quarterly, they are aggregated to the annual level for
estimation. The full sample consists of over 49 million annualized employment records on
full-time workers between 25 and 65 years of age who were employed at private-sector non-
agricultural rms between 1990 and 1999.
Missing values are imputed from the posterior predictive distribution of a parametric
missing data model. Specics on the imputation models, and further details on sample
construction and variable creation, are given in the Data Appendix to Woodcock (2005a).
Because the xed e¤ect estimators described in Section 3.2 do not solve the least squares
normal equations directly, it is possible to estimate the xed e¤ect specications on very
large samples.22 Unfortunately, there currently exists no similar computational alternative
to solving the mixed model equations. We must therefore estimate the mixed e¤ect speci-
cations on a subsample of observations. Sampling from linked employer-employee data is
nontrivial because the sample must be su¢ ciently connected to precisely estimate the person,
rm, and match e¤ects. We therefore draw a ten percent subsample of individuals employed
in 1997 using the dense sampling algorithm of Woodcock (2005b). This algorithm ensures
that each worker is connected to at least ve others by a common employer, but is otherwise
representative of the population of individuals employed in 1997. That is, all individuals em-
ployed in 1997 have an equal probability of being sampled.23 The dense subsample consists
22The cross-products matrix in the least squares normal equations has N + J + M + k + 1 rows and
columns. Solving the normal equations requires inverting this matrix. This is infeasible for samples of the
size considered here. Our xed e¤ect estimates are based on the ACK conjugate gradient algorithm, which
does not invert this matrix.
23The dense sampling algorithm ensures that individuals are connected to a specied minimum number of
other workers by a common employer. This is achieved by rst sampling rms with probabilities proportional
to employment in a reference period, and then sampling workers within rms with probabilities inversely
15
of the full work history of each sampled individual. To enable direct comparison of results
between the xed and mixed e¤ect specications, we estimate the xed e¤ect specications
on the full work histories of all individuals employed in 1997.
Table 1 presents characteristics of the samples. The sample of individuals employed in
1997 is largely representative of the full sample of observations. Some slight di¤erences
indicate that individuals employed in 1997 have a slightly stronger labor force attachment
than the sample of all individuals employed between 1990 and 1999: males are slightly
over-represented, as are individuals with higher educational attainment and individuals who
work four full quarters in an average calendar year. The ten percent dense subsample has
characteristics virtually identical to the sample of all individuals employed in 1997.
5 Estimation Results
In discussing the empirical estimates, we focus on two comparisons. Because most prior
empirical work is based on the xed e¤ect specication of the person and rm e¤ects model,
we take this as our baseline specication. We compare the baseline specication to mixed
e¤ect estimates of the person and rm e¤ects model. This comparison highlights the di¤er-
ence between xed and mixed e¤ect estimation methods. Our second comparison is between
mixed e¤ect estimates of the person and rm e¤ects model and mixed e¤ect estimates of the
match e¤ects model. This comparison highlights the importance of match e¤ects.
Table 2 presents estimated coe¢ cients (; ) for xed and mixed e¤ect specications of the
person and rm e¤ects model. The xed e¤ect estimates are consistent with earlier work.
The xed e¤ect estimator produces somewhat steeper experience and education proles
than the mixed e¤ect estimator does. We discuss this further below. The other estimated
coe¢ cients are very similar across specications, with the exception of coe¢ cients on several
missing data indicators.
Table 3 presents estimated coe¢ cients for xed and mixed e¤ect specications of the
match e¤ects model. The estimated coe¢ cients are broadly similar across specications of
the match e¤ects model, and broadly similar to the person and rm e¤ects model. There
are some notable exceptions, however. As illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, the person and rm
e¤ects model consistently over-estimates the returns to experience. For instance, xed e¤ect
estimates of the person and rm e¤ects model imply that a male worker with 25 years of labor
market experience earns 0.78 log points (118 percent) more than a labor market entrant, all
proportional to rm employment. A minimum of 5 employees are sampled from each rm. All workers
employed in the reference period have an equal probability of being sampled, but the algorithm guarantees
that each worker is connected to at least 5 others by a common employer.
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else equal. The mixed e¤ect estimator of the person and rm e¤ects model reduces this
estimate to 0.70 log points (101 percent), and introducing the match e¤ect reduces it further
to 0.65 log points (92 percent). For women, the earnings di¤erential accruing to 25 years
experience is 0.59 log points (80 percent) in the xed e¤ect specication of the person and
rm e¤ects model, 0.43 log points in the comparable mixed e¤ect specication, and 0.39 log
points (48 percent) in the mixed model with match e¤ects. The withinestimator (12) on
which the orthogonal match e¤ects and hybrid mixed e¤ect estimators are based yields an
even atter experience prole. Here, the 25 year earnings gap is 0.52 log points (68 percent)
for men and 0.36 log points (43 percent) for women.24 Hence the baseline specication over-
estimates the returns to 25 years of experience by as much as 0.26 log points (50 percent)
for men, and 0.23 log points (37 percent) for women.
Because introducing the match e¤ect attens the experience prole so markedly, it seems
that a considerable fraction of the returns traditionally attributed to labor market experience
(i.e., the accumulation of general human capital) actually reects the acquisition of match-
specic human capital. A possible explanation is that individuals sort into better matches
over the course of their career. When match e¤ects are omitted, the higher earnings associ-
ated with sorting are attributed to labor market experience. We return to this idea below,
when we investigate the sources of earnings growth when individuals change employer.
To a lesser degree, the baseline model also over-estimates the returns to education. It
estimates that men with a college degree earn 0.25 log points (29 percent) more than male
high-school graduates, all else equal, compared to 0.21 log points (23 percent) in the mixed
model with match e¤ects. The comparable estimates are 0.29 log points (33 percent) and
0.23 log points (25 percent), respectively, for women. Here too, it seems that some of
the returns traditionally associated with general human capital (education) actually reect
match-specic human capital. A possible explanation is that more educated workers sort
into better matches than less educated workers. When match e¤ects are omitted, the returns
to sorting into good matches are incorrectly attributed to education.
Table 4 presents the estimated variance of log earnings components. In all specications,
person e¤ects exhibit the greatest dispersion and the returns to time-varying characteristics
exhibit the least. This is consistent with earlier estimates of the person and rm e¤ects
model, e.g., AKM, ACK, and Woodcock (2005a). The traditional mixed model and hybrid
mixed model give very similar results, so we focus on results for the traditional mixed model.
The xed e¤ect estimator of the person and rm e¤ects model exhibits the greatest
dispersion in person e¤ects (0.274 squared log points) and time-varying covariates (0.031),
24Note this estimate is based entirely on within-job variation in earnings, i.e., it ignores earnings growth
that occurs when individuals change employer.
17
and the least dispersion in rm e¤ects (0.065). In contrast, the mixed e¤ect estimator of
the person and rm e¤ects model exhibits slightly less dispersion in person e¤ects (0.258)
and time-varying covariates (0.029), and considerably more dispersion in rm e¤ects (0.158).
Introducing the match e¤ect reduces variation in the person e¤ect further (to 0.189), and
reduces dispersion in the rm e¤ect to 0.104. These imply a one standard deviation increase
in the value of the person e¤ect increases log earnings by 0.435, and a one standard deviation
increase in the value of the rm e¤ect increases log earnings by 0.322. The variance of the
match e¤ect itself is 0.079, so that a one standard deviation increase in the value of the
match e¤ect increases earnings by 0.28 log points. This is also very substantial and nearly
as large as the rm e¤ect.
These results imply that some of the variation attributed to the match e¤ect is incorrectly
attributed to person and rm e¤ects in prior work. This not surprising, given the expres-
sion we derived for the bias due to omitted match e¤ects. However, some of the variation
attributed to the match e¤ect was formerly unexplained, as we see from the reduced error
variance (from 0.052 to 0.036) when the match e¤ect is introduced.
The orthogonal match e¤ect estimator produces quite di¤erent results. The estimates
are very similar to the person and rm e¤ects model, with only trivial variation in the match
e¤ect (0.022 squared log points). This is not surprising given the orthogonality assumption.
Before proceeding further, we formally test for the presence of match e¤ects. The test
is straightforward and the results are in Table 4. In the xed model, the null hypothesis is
H0 : ij = 0 for each i; j pair in the data, i.e., that all match e¤ects are zero. This is a test
of M  N  J = 4; 176; 870 linear restrictions.25 We test this hypothesis with a conventional
Wald test. Given the number of restrictions, it is no surprise that we easily reject the null
of no match e¤ects at conventional signicance levels.26
In the mixed model specications, the null of no match e¤ects is H0 : 2 = 0:We test this
hypothesis with a likelihood ratio test based on the REML log-likelihoods of specications
with and without match e¤ects. Because the null hypothesis places 2 on the boundary of
the parameter space, the test statistic has a non-standard asymptotic distribution. Stram
and Lee (1994) show its asymptotic distribution is a 50:50 mixture of a 20 and a 
2
1: Once
again, we easily reject the null of no match e¤ects at conventional signicance levels.27
25When the data consist of G connected groups of observations, there are N+G N   J   k  1 degrees
of freedom in the model without match e¤ects, and N + G  M   k   1 degrees of freedom in the model
with match e¤ects. The model without match e¤ects therefore imposes
(N +G N   J   k   1)  (N +G M   k   1) =M  N   J
linearly independent restictions on the estimated e¤ects.
26The value of the Wald statistic is around 18 million.
27The value of the likelihood ratio statistic is over 35 thousand for both mixed models.
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Table 5 presents sample correlations between the estimated e¤ects in the person and
rm e¤ects model. Table 6 presents the same information for the match e¤ects model.
In each case, the person e¤ect is most strongly correlated with log earnings (between 0.79
and 0.89). The rm e¤ect is also strongly correlated with log earnings: between 0.41 and
0.57, depending on specication. The returns to time-varying covariates are less strongly
correlated with log earnings (between 0.25 and 0.30). There is considerable variation in
the estimated correlation between match e¤ects and log earnings across specications. The
correlation is 0.23 in the orthogonal match e¤ect specication, which is comparable to the
correlation between observable characteristics and log earnings. In contrast, the correlation
between the match e¤ect and log earnings is around 0.60 in both mixed e¤ect specications,
which is second only to the correlation between the person e¤ect and log earnings.
There are several other items of note in Tables 5 and 6. One is that introducing the
match e¤ect strengthens the correlation between the person e¤ect and log earnings in all
specications. It also strengthens the correlation between the rm e¤ect and log earnings
in both mixed e¤ect specications. The match e¤ect evidently helps disentangle person-
and rm-specic components of log earnings. Furthermore, notice that the estimated match
e¤ect is positively correlated with person and rm e¤ects in both mixed e¤ect specications.
The correlation with the person e¤ect, in particular, is su¢ ciently strong (0.49) that the
orthogonal match e¤ect specication seems dubious.28
The correlation between person and rm e¤ects is approximately zero in the xed e¤ect
specication of the person and rm e¤ects model and the orthogonal match e¤ects model.
This is consistent with earlier estimates of the person and rm e¤ects model based on US data
(e.g., ACK and Woodcock (2005a)). Recently, Andrews et al. (2004) have argued that when
the true correlation between person and rm e¤ects is positive, the estimated correlation
based on least squares estimates of the person and rm e¤ects model is biased downward. In
light of this, it is interesting to note that the correlation is noticeably larger in both mixed
e¤ect specications of the person and rm e¤ects model (0.09). Introducing the match e¤ect
further increases the correlation between person and rm e¤ects by a factor of two. This
suggests the bias noted by Andrews et al. (2004) is partly a characteristic of the xed e¤ect
estimator, and partly due to the omission of match e¤ects.
28The substantial correlation between person and match e¤ects might seem to contradict the assumed
conditional covariance of the random e¤ects in (19). The Bayesian interpretation of the mixed e¤ect model
is helpful in understanding this result. In the Bayesian formulation, the conditional moment restrictions
(18) and (19) are the mean and variance of informative priors on the distribution of the random e¤ects. An
estimated non-zero correlation between random e¤ects is evidence that the priors are swamped by data.
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5.1 Decomposing the Variance of log Earnings
The match e¤ects model denes a formal decomposition of the variance of log earnings
into components attributable to time-varying observables, person e¤ects, rm e¤ects, match
e¤ects, and a residual component. Specically,
V ar (yijt) = Cov (yijt; yijt) = Cov

yijt; ^+ x
0
ijt^ + ^i +  ^j + ^ij + eijt

(24)
= Cov

yijt; x
0
ijt^

+ Cov

yijt; ^i

+ Cov

yijt;  ^j

+ Cov

yijt; ^ij

+ Cov (yijt; eijt)
where ^; ^i;  ^j; ^ij are sample estimates dened by any of the xed or mixed e¤ect estima-
tors, and eijt is the corresponding residual. Gruetter and Lalive (2004) present a similar
decomposition for the person and rm e¤ects model. We have the proportional decomposi-
tion:
Cov

yijt; x
0
ijt^

V ar (yijt)
+
Cov

yijt; ^i

V ar (yijt)
+
Cov

yijt;  ^j

V ar (yijt)
+
Cov

yijt; ^ij

V ar (yijt)
+
Cov (yijt; eijt)
V ar (yijt)
= 1:
(25)
Of course we can further decompose Cov

yijt; ^i

= Cov (yijt; ^i) + Cov (yijt; u
0
i^) :
We present the proportional decomposition (25) in Table 7. In our baseline specication,
nearly 64 percent of the variance of log earnings is attributed to person e¤ects. Firm e¤ects
contribute the next largest component, about 16 percent. Conditional on person and rm
e¤ects, time-varying covariates explain only 6.7 percent of the variance of log earnings,
leaving more than 13 percent unexplained. Results for mixed models with person and rm
e¤ects are very similar, though both mixed e¤ect estimators attribute slightly more variation
to rm e¤ects and slightly less to person e¤ects.
Introducing the match e¤ect dramatically reduces the proportion of the variance of log
earnings attributed to person e¤ects: it is below 46 percent in the traditional mixed model
and about 48 percent in the hybrid mixed model. Introducing the match e¤ect also increases
the proportion attributed to rm e¤ects to 22 percent now roughly half of the proportion
attributed to person e¤ects. Once again, it seems that introducing match e¤ects helps
disentangle person- and rm-specic components of earnings. The match e¤ect explains
about 16 percent of the variance of log earnings. This is substantial and more than twice
the variation explained by time-varying observables. Finally, the unexplained component
falls below 9 percent of the variance of log earnings. Thus about a quarter of the variance
explained by match e¤ects was unexplained by the baseline specication. The remaining
three quarters were incorrectly attributed to other components of earnings.
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5.2 Earnings Growth and Job Mobility
The match e¤ects model also provides a formal decomposition of the sources of earnings
growth when individuals change employers. For an individual i who changes employers (from
employer j to employer n in periods t and s, respectively), the gross change in earnings is
y = yins   yijt
=
 
x0ins   x0ijt

^ +

 ^n    ^j

+

^in   ^ij

+ (eins   eijt)
 x^ + ++e:
This denes a simple decomposition of earnings changes into components attributable to the
change in time-varying observables, rm e¤ects, match e¤ects, and a residual component.
Again, we dene a proportional decomposition
x^
y
+
 
y
+

y
+
e
y
= 1 (26)
that aggregates linearly over job transitions. We use (26) to decompose the mean change in
log earnings when individuals change employers into its respective components.
To decompose wage changes via (26), we focus on job-to-job transitions for two reasons.
First, non-employment in the LEHD data is only identied by the absence of a UI record.
Periods of non-employment may therefore reect unemployment, withdrawal from the la-
bor force, employment not covered by the UI reporting system, or employment in a state
other than the two in our sample. These may confound our ability to identify a genuine
transition from one employer to another. Job-to-job transitions, which we dene as em-
ployment spells that overlap by at least one quarter, are less subject to these confounding
inuences. Second, job-to-job transitions are arguably more likely to violate the exogenous
mobility assumption than those with an intervening period of unemployment because they
are more likely to be driven by good and badmatches. Gruetter and Lalive (2004)
argue this point at length. By focusing on job-to-job transitions, we can look for evidence
of exogenous mobility in specications with and without match e¤ects. If the proportion
of earnings growth attributed to the residual component is statistically signicant, we take
this as evidence that the exogenous mobility assumption is violated. We formalize this with
the null hypothesis H0 : 1M
P
(eins   eijt) = 0 where the summation is over all job-to-job
employment transitions, and M is the number of transitions.
Table 8 presents the results of the decomposition (26). The mean annual change in real log
earnings is 0.03 log points. Individuals that change jobs, in contrast, experience an average
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increase in log earnings of 0.045 log points (0.049 in the dense subsample). Average log
earnings growth in the subset of job-to-job transitions is even larger: about 0.08 log points. Of
this, our baseline specication attributes the largest component (about 40 percent) to time-
varying covariatesX^: Firm e¤ects also contribute signicantly (31.6 percent). This suggests
that workers ascend a rm ladderwhen they change jobs by moving into employment at
higher paying rms. But notice that a large component of log earnings growth remains
unexplained in the person and rm e¤ects model: nearly 29 percent of log earnings growth
is due to the residual component. Consequently, we easily reject the null that the residual
component is zero at conventional signicance levels. We take this as evidence that the
person and rm e¤ects model violates the exogenous mobility assumption.
The decomposition is similar for the mixed e¤ect specication of the person and rm
e¤ects model. This specication attributes a larger proportion of log earnings growth to
rm e¤ects (nearly 40 percent) and a smaller proportion to the residual component (21.5
percent). Nevertheless, we still easily reject the null that the residual component is zero.
Introducing the match e¤ect overturns this result. Time-varying covariates and rm
e¤ects still contribute about equally to log earnings growth when individuals change jobs
about 40 percent each in both mixed e¤ect specications. Match e¤ects explain nearly
all of the remainder: about 18 percent in the mixed e¤ect specications and 30 percent
in the orthogonal match e¤ects specication. Hence individuals sort into better matches
when changing jobs, as well as into higher paying rms. This corroborates our earlier claim
that individuals sort into better matches over the course of a career, which we posited as
an explanation for the biased experience e¤ect in the person and rm e¤ects model. The
substantial earnings growth accounted for by match e¤ects leaves little variation unexplained:
in both mixed e¤ect models the residual component explains only about 1 percent of average
growth in log earnings, and about 4 percent in the orthogonal match e¤ects specication.
Indeed, in both mixed e¤ect specications we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the
residual component is zero at the ve percent level. We take this as evidence that the mixed
e¤ect estimator of the match e¤ects model satises the exogenous mobility assumption.
6 Conclusion
The match e¤ects model illuminates the relative importance of worker-specic, rm-specic,
and match-specic components of labor earnings. We interpret these as the returns to gen-
eral, rm-specic, and match-specic human capital, respectively. The model attributes
just over half of observed variation in log earnings to the combined e¤ect of time-varying
and time-invariant components of general human capital. Firm-specic human capital con-
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tributes an additional 22 percent, and match-specic human capital another 16 percent.
Introducing the match e¤ect helps to disentangle person and rm-specic components
of earnings, and corrects several biases in the person and rm e¤ects. The person and rm
e¤ects model overestimates the returns to labor market experience and education, attributes
too much variation to person e¤ects and too little to rm e¤ects, and underestimates the
correlation between person and rm e¤ects. Taken together, these suggest that some earnings
variation previously attributed to general human capital is in fact attributable to workers
sorting into higher-paying rms and better worker-rm matches. Consequently, the person
and rm e¤ects model underestimates the implied cost of employment re-allocation over the
business cycle because it understates the importance of specic human capital and overstates
the importance of general human capital.
These biases arise because employment mobility is not exogenous conditional on observ-
able characteristics, person e¤ects, and rm e¤ects. We nd evidence, however, that exo-
geneity holds when we control for match e¤ects. Indeed, match e¤ects explain a substantial
portion of the change in log earnings when individuals change employers.
Our specication treats rm and match e¤ects as time-invariant. In reality, rm-specic
human capital and match-specic human capital probably accumulate over the course of an
employment relationship. A fruitful avenue for future research is to examine the evolution
rm and match e¤ects over time.
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A Appendix: A Model of Human Capital, Wages, and
Mobility
This appendix develops a simple two-period model of wage bargaining with on-the-job search.
The model illustrates several key points argued in the text regarding the relationship between
match-specic human capital, wages, and mobility. Specically, it demonstrates that when
productivity depends on match-specic human capital, so do mobility and wages. This
violates the exogenous mobility assumption of the person and rm e¤ects model.
Workers live for two periods. In each period, they are endowed with a single indivisible
unit of labor that they supply to production at home or at a rm. Home production generates
income h: Workers maximize the expected present value of income.
In each period, the worker meets a rm in a matching market. In the rst period she
meets Firm 1,and in the second period she meets Firm 2.Firms produce a homogeneous
good with price normalized to one. They only produce output when matched with a worker.
The worker produces output q at Firm 1 q0 at Firm 2. Both q and q0 are random variables
distributed according to F on support

q; q

: Productivity is unknown until the worker and
rm meet, but is observable thereafter.
Firms maximize the net revenues from a match. For Firm 1, this is q   wt where wt
denotes the period t wage payment to the worker. For Firm 2, net revenues are q0   w0t:
Wages are determined by a Nash bargain between worker and rm. The workers share of
the surplus is  2 (0; 1) : Workers and rms discount future income at the common rate :
The workers value of being employed in period t is Jt. The rms value of employing the
worker is t. The rms outside option is to forego production, whose value is normalized to
zero. The value of the workers best alternative to employment at the rm is Ut: The worker
and rm mutually agree to engage in production if the joint surplus is non-negative, i.e., if
Jt +t  Ut:In this case, the wage payment wt (or w0t) solves
max
wt
(Jt   Ut) 1 t : (27)
The models solution consists of the workers optimal mobility strategy and a schedule of
wage o¤ers. These are summarized in the following proposition. The proof is in Appendix
B.
Proposition 1 In the rst period, the workers optimal strategy is to accept employment at
Firm 1 if q  h and remain unemployed otherwise. If she accepts employment, she is paid
w1 = q + (1  )h+ (1  )
2
2  
Z q
h
[(2  ) (h  q0) + (q0   q)] dF: (28)
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If the worker begins the second period unemployed, she optimally accepts employment at
Firm 2 if q0  h (Case 0), and remains unemployed otherwise. If she accepts, she is paid
w02;C0 = q
0 + (1  )h:
If the worker begins the second period employed at Firm 1, her optimal strategy is as fol-
lows. If q0  h  q (Case 1) she remains employed at Firm 1 and is paid w2;C1 =
q + (1  )h: If h  q0  q (Case 2), she remains employed at Firm 1 and is paid
w2;C2 = (2  ) 1 [q + (1  ) q0] : Finally, if h  q < q0 (Case 3), she quits employ-
ment at Firm 1 and accepts employment at Firm 2. In this case, the wage is w02;C3 =
(2  ) 1 [q0 + (1  ) q] :
The rst-period wage (28) is the sum of three components: [1] the workers share  of
output, [2] compensation for foregoing the income generated by home production, and [3]
the option value of employment (the expectation term). In the proof, we show that the
option value is non-positive. The intuition is simple: the workers second-period bargaining
position is weakly improved if she is already employed at Firm 1, and she is consequently
willing to accept a reduced rst-period wage. To see this, note that the second-period wage
is the bargaining-strength weighted average of match productivity and the workers outside
option. If she begins the second period unemployed (Case 0), or if she begins the second
period employed but is less productive at Firm 2 than in home production (Case 1), then
her outside option is h. When she is more productive at Firm 2 than in home production
(Cases 2 and 3), her outside option is employment at the other rm, at a wage greater than
h: Hence employment weakly improves her second period bargaining position.
Notice the worker changes employers if q0 > q: Hence wages and mobility both depend on
productivity. If productivity depends on match-specic human capital, then so do wages and
mobility. This violates the exogenous mobility assumption underlying the person and rm
e¤ect specication (1) if the econometrician cannot observe match-specic human capital
directly.
There are two limiting cases of this simple model that give rise to the match e¤ects model.
First, normalize h to zero and let worker is productivity at rm j in period t be given by
qijt = e
m+x0ijt+i+ j+ij (29)
where m is the mean of log-productivity (common to all matches) and other terms are as
dened in the main text.
The rst case arises when the worker captures the entire match surplus, so that she is
paid the value of her marginal product. That is, as  ! 1 the period t wage at rm j is
wijt ! qijt: Taking logarithms gives the match e¤ects model.
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The second case is more subtle. As the di¤erence between the workers productivity at
Firm 1 and Firm 2 vanishes (i.e., as q0   q ! 0) the second-period wage is wij2 ! qij2 in
Cases 0 and 1, and wij2 ! qij2 in Cases 2 and 3. Again, taking logarithms gives the match
e¤ects model.29 Furthermore, as the expected di¤erence between her productivity at Firm
1 and Firm 2 vanishes, i.e., as

(1  )3
2  
Z q
0
(q0   q) dF ! 0;
the rst period wage is wij1 ! qij1
h
    (1  )2 R q
0
dF
i
. This case arises, for example, as
the workers productivity at Firm 1 approaches the conditional mean of productivity given
xijt and i: Once again, taking logarithms gives the match e¤ects model. The option value
term, qij1 (1  )2
R q
0
dF; will be reected in the estimated returns to experience.
B Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We solve the model backward. The worker begins the second
period in one of two states. She is either unemployed or employed at Firm 1. If she is
unemployed and meets Firm 2 in the matching market (Case 0), she must decide whether
to remain unemployed or accept employment. Therefore U2 = h; J2 = w02, and 
0
2 = q
0 w02:
The wage payment that solves the Nash bargain is w02 = q
0+(1  )h: The worker accepts
employment at Firm 2 if J2 +02  U2; which implies q0  h:
If the worker begins the second period employed at Firm 1, she must choose between
unemployment, employment at Firm 1, and employment at Firm 2. The optimal action
depends on q; q0; and h: There are three relevant subcases where q  h: We establish below
that subcases where q < h are irrelevant because the worker will not accept employment in
the rst period under these conditions.
The rst subcase (Case 1) is q0  h  q. The maximum wage that Firm 2 can o¤er is
w02 = q
0  h: The worker prefers unemployment to employment at Firm 2, so she chooses
between unemployment and employment at Firm 1. Therefore U2 = h; J2 = w2, and 2 =
q w2: The wage payment that solves (27) is w2 = q+(1  )h: Since J2+2 = q  h = U2
the worker accepts the o¤er and remains employed at Firm 1.
29The intercept di¤ers in these two cases: it is ln  +m in Cases 0 and 1, and m in Cases 2 and 3. Case
1 is likely to be empirically indistinguishable from Case 2, since in either case the worker remains at Firm 1
(her wage only changes because of the change in her outside option.) This will bias the estimated intercept,
but this is rarely a concern. However, because the value of the intercept depends on her employment history
(whether or not she was employed in period 1, i.e., Case 0 vs. Cases 2 and 3), the di¤erence in intercepts
may be partly reected in the estimated returns to experience.
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The second possibility is h < q0  q (Case 2). In this case, both rms can o¤er wages
greater than h: The worker prefers employment at either rm to unemployment, and she
must choose whether to remain employed at Firm 1 or move to Firm 2. When bargaining
with Firm 1, U2 = w02; J2 = w2, and 2 = q   w2; and when bargaining with Firm 2,
U2 = w2; J2 = w
0
2; and 
0
2 = q
0   w02. The rmswage o¤ers solve the system of equations:
w2 = q + (1  )w02 (30)
w02 = q
0 + (1  )w2:
The unique solution is:
w2 = (2  ) 1 [q + (1  ) q0] (31)
w02 = (2  ) 1 [q0 + (1  ) q] : (32)
Because q  q0 and  2 (0; 1) it follows immediately that w2  w02. Thus the worker
optimally chooses to remain at Firm 1.
The nal possibility is h  q < q0 (Case 3). Again, both rms can o¤er wages greater
than h; so the worker chooses between continued employment at Firm 1 and moving to Firm
2. As in the previous case, the rmswage o¤ers solve (30), resulting in the wage o¤ers (31)
and (32). Now q0 > q; which implies w02 > w2; so the worker moves to Firm 2.
In the rst period, the worker chooses between unemployment and employment at Firm
1. The value of being unemployed in period 1 and behaving optimally thereafter is
U1 = h+ E [max fJ2; U2g ;A = 0] = h+ E [max fw02; hg ;A = 0] (33)
where the expectation is taken over q0; and where A = 1 if the worker accepts employment
in the rst period and zero otherwise. The worker and rm value employment in period 1
as follows
J1 = w1 + E [max fJ2; U2g ;A = 1] = w1 + E [max fw2; w02; hg ;A = 1] (34)
1 = q   w1 + E [max f2; 0g ;A = 1] = q   w1 + E [max fq   w2; 0g ;A = 1] : (35)
The worker and Firm 1 engage in production if Jt +t  Ut, which implies
q  h  
 
E [max fw2; w02; hg ;A = 1] + E [max fq   w2; 0g ;A = 1]
 E [max fw02; hg ;A = 0]
!
 q1: (36)
Here, q1 is the reservation productivity above which the worker and rm mutually agree
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that employment is benecial, and below which they prefer to separate. Lemma 2 establishes
q1 = h: Hence the worker accepts employment in the rst period if q  h. The wage payment
that solves (27) is
w1 =  (q + E [max fq   w2; 0g ;A = 1])
+ (1  ) (h+ E [max fw02; hg ;A = 0]  E [max fw2; w02; hg ;A = 1]) : (37)
The various expectations are
E [max fq   w2; 0g ;A = 1] =
Z h
q
(1  ) (q   h) dF +
Z q
h
1  
2   (q   q
0) dF
E [max fw02; hg ;A = 0] =
Z h
q
hdF +
Z q
h
[q0 + (1  )h] dF
E [max fw2; w02; hg ;A = 1] =
Z h
q
[q + (1  )h] dF +
Z q
h
1
2   [q + (1  ) q
0] dF
+
Z q
q
1
2   [q
0 + (1  ) q] dF:
Collecting terms gives
w1 = q + (1  )h+ (1  )
2
2  
Z q
h
[(2  ) (h  q0) + (q0   q)] dF
+
(1  )2
2  
Z q
q
[(1  ) (h  q0) + (h  q)] dF (38)
= q + (1  )h+ (1  )
2
2  
Z q
h
[(2  ) (h  q0) + (q0   q)] dF:
The integral terms reect the option value of employment. In (38), it is easy to see that
the option value is non-positive: in the rst integral, h  q0  q; and in the second integral,
h  q < q0:
Lemma 2 q1 = h:
Proof of Lemma 2. Let
Z = E [max fw02; hg ;A = 0]  E [max fw2; w02; hg ;A = 1]  E [max fq   w2; 0g ;A = 1]
and suppose to the contrary that q1 > h: This implies Z > 0: Let h < q

1  q so the worker
accepts employment in the rst period. Because q > h we know Firm 1 will o¤er a second
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period wage w2  h, and hence max fw2; w02; hg = max fw2; w02g : Therefore
E [max fw02; hg ;A = 0] =
Z h
q
hdF +
Z q
h
[(1  )h+ q0] dF (39)
E [max fw2; w02; hg ;A = 1] =
Z h
q
[(1  )h+ q] dF +
Z q
h
1
2   [q + (1  ) q
0] dF
+
Z q
q
1
2   [q
0 + (1  ) q] dF (40)
E [max fq   w2; 0g ;A = 1] =
Z h
q
(1  ) (q   h) dF
+
Z q
h

q   1
2   [q + (1  ) q
0]

dF: (41)
Rearranging gives:
Z =
Z h
q
(h  q) dF +
Z q
h
[(1  ) (h  q) +  (q0   q)] dF
+
Z q
q

(1  )2 (h  q0) + (1  ) (h  q) dF (42)
< 0;
a contradiction.
Suppose instead that q1 < h. This implies Z < 0: Let q

1  q < h so the worker accepts
employment in the rst period. Because q < h; the largest second period wage that Firm 1
can o¤er is w2 < h. Hence max fw2; w02; hg = max fw02; hg and max fq   w2; 0g = 0: Thus
Z = 0; another contradiction.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS
(Sample Proportions Unless Otherwise Stated)
FULL SAMPLE
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Demographic Characteristics
Male 0.56 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.57 0.50
Age (Years) 40.6 10.2 40.3 9.6 40.3 9.6
Men
Nonwhite 0.21 0.57 0.20 0.55 0.20 0.56
Race Missing 0.04 0.25 0.03 0.24 0.03 0.24
Less Than High School 0.12 0.45 0.11 0.43 0.11 0.43
High School 0.30 0.67 0.30 0.65 0.29 0.66
Some College 0.23 0.60 0.23 0.59 0.23 0.59
Associate or Bachelor's Degree 0.25 0.62 0.25 0.61 0.25 0.62
Graduate or Professional Degree 0.10 0.42 0.11 0.42 0.11 0.42
Women
Nonwhite 0.24 0.69 0.24 0.71 0.25 0.72
Race Missing 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.22
Less Than High School 0.09 0.45 0.09 0.45 0.09 0.44
High School 0.31 0.78 0.30 0.79 0.30 0.78
Some College 0.25 0.71 0.25 0.73 0.25 0.72
Associate or Bachelor's Degree 0.26 0.72 0.27 0.75 0.27 0.75
Graduate or Professional Degree 0.08 0.42 0.09 0.44 0.09 0.44
Work History Characteristics
Real Annualized Earnings (1990 Dollars) 41,107 38,849 43,183 39,324 43,528 38,782
Men
Labor Market Experience (Years) 11.8 13.1 11.9 12.7 11.8 12.7
Worked 0 Full Quarters in Calendar Year 0.08 0.36 0.06 0.32 0.06 0.32
Worked 1 Full Quarter in Calendar Year 0.15 0.49 0.12 0.44 0.12 0.44
Worked 2 Full Quarters in Calendar Year 0.13 0.47 0.12 0.44 0.12 0.44
Worked 3 Full Quarters in Calendar Year 0.14 0.48 0.13 0.46 0.14 0.47
Worked 4 Full Quarters in Calendar Year 0.50 0.80 0.56 0.81 0.57 0.00
Women
Labor Market Experience (Years) 9.5 13.0 9.0 12.5 9.2 12.6
Worked 0 Full Quarters in Calendar Year 0.07 0.39 0.06 0.36 0.05 0.35
Worked 1 Full Quarter in Calendar Year 0.14 0.54 0.11 0.50 0.11 0.50
Worked 2 Full Quarters in Calendar Year 0.13 0.53 0.12 0.51 0.11 0.50
Worked 3 Full Quarters in Calendar Year 0.14 0.55 0.13 0.54 0.13 0.54
Worked 4 Full Quarters in Calendar Year 0.52 0.96 0.58 1.02 0.59 1.01
Year
1990 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26
1991 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27
1992 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28
1993 0.10 0.29 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28
1994 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.29
1995 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.31 0.10 0.31
1996 0.10 0.31 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.32
1997 0.11 0.31 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.34
1998 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32
1999 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31
Number of Observations 49,291,205 37,688,492 3,652,544
Number of Workers 9,272,529 5,235,887 503,179
Number of Firms 573,307 476,745 121,227
Number of Worker­Firm Matches 15,309,134 9,889,502 947,883
Number of Connected Groups 84,748 46,829 1,460
ALL INDIVIDUALS 
EMPLOYED IN 1997
TEN PERCENT 
DENSE SUBSAMPLE
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS: PERSON AND FIRM EFFECTS MODEL
FIXED MODEL MIXED MODEL
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Male x Experience 0.074 0.000 0.066 0.001
­0.243 0.001 ­0.213 0.005
0.036 0.000 0.029 0.001
­0.002 0.000 ­0.002 0.000
Male x Worked 0 Full Quarters 0.035 0.000 0.030 0.001
Male x Worked 1 Full Quarters ­0.004 0.000 ­0.007 0.001
Male x Worked 2 Full Quarters ­0.013 0.000 ­0.014 0.001
Male x Worked 3 Full Quarters ­0.015 0.000 ­0.014 0.001
Female x Experience 0.031 0.000 0.029 0.001
­0.020 0.001 ­0.052 0.005
­0.006 0.000 0.002 0.001
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Female x Worked 0 Full Quarters 0.010 0.000 ­0.001 0.001
Female x Worked 1 Full Quarters ­0.006 0.000 ­0.012 0.001
Female x Worked 2 Full Quarters ­0.014 0.000 ­0.019 0.001
Female x Worked 3 Full Quarters ­0.020 0.000 ­0.029 0.001
Male x High School 0.075 0.000 0.079 0.003 0.056 0.003
Male x Some College 0.168 0.000 0.169 0.003 0.143 0.003
Male x Associate or Bachelor's Degree 0.329 0.000 0.316 0.003 0.282 0.003
Male x Graduate or Professional Degree 0.526 0.000 0.493 0.004 0.458 0.004
Male x Nonwhite ­0.326 0.000 ­0.351 0.002 ­0.369 0.002
Male x Race Missing 0.006 0.001 ­0.061 0.005 ­0.067 0.005
  Male x First Period Potential Experience <0 ­0.074 0.001 ­0.080 0.005 ­0.199 0.005
Female x Less Than High School ­0.254 0.001 ­0.166 0.007 ­0.227 0.004
Female x High School ­0.073 0.000 ­0.048 0.006 ­0.152 0.003
Female x Some College 0.033 0.000 0.042 0.006 ­0.064 0.003
Female x Bachelor or Associate's Degree 0.212 0.000 0.200 0.006 0.089 0.003
Female x Graduate or Professional Degree 0.396 0.001 0.374 0.007 0.261 0.005
Female x Nonwhite ­0.121 0.000 ­0.127 0.002 ­0.136 0.002
Female x Race Missing ­0.004 0.001 ­0.041 0.007 ­0.047 0.007
Female x First Period Potential Experience <0 0.092 0.001 0.032 0.006 ­0.032 0.006
Intercept 9.84 0.001 9.69 0.005 9.87 0.003
Year Effects YES YES YES
HYBRID MIXED 
MODEL
Time­Varying Characteristics (
Male x Experience2 / 100
Male x Experience3 / 1000
Male x Experience4 / 10000
Female x Experience2 / 100
Female x Experience3 / 1000
Female x Experience4 / 10000
Time­Invariant Characteristics‡ (
Notes: Fixed model is estimated on the sample of all individuals employed in 1997. Both mixed model specifications are estimated on the ten 
percent dense subsample. Time­varying coefficients in the hybrid mixed model are the same as fixed effects estimates of the match effects model 
(Table 3).
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS: MATCH EFFECTS MODEL
FIXED MODEL MIXED MODEL
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Male x Experience 0.058 0.000 0.061 0.001
­0.215 0.001 ­0.200 0.005
0.033 0.000 0.028 0.001
­0.002 0.000 ­0.002 0.000
Male x Worked 0 Full Quarters 0.053 0.000 0.042 0.001
Male x Worked 1 Full Quarters 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.001
Male x Worked 2 Full Quarters ­0.007 0.000 ­0.010 0.001
Male x Worked 3 Full Quarters ­0.013 0.000 ­0.012 0.000
Female x Experience 0.018 0.000 0.024 0.001
0.004 0.001 ­0.033 0.005
­0.010 0.000 ­0.001 0.001
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Female x Worked 0 Full Quarters 0.029 0.000 0.012 0.001
Female x Worked 1 Full Quarters 0.008 0.000 ­0.003 0.001
Female x Worked 2 Full Quarters ­0.009 0.000 ­0.016 0.001
Female x Worked 3 Full Quarters ­0.017 0.000 ­0.027 0.001
Male x High School 0.054 0.000 0.074 0.003 0.051 0.003
Male x Some College 0.143 0.000 0.158 0.003 0.131 0.003
Male x Associate or Bachelor's Degree 0.294 0.000 0.300 0.003 0.265 0.003
Male x Graduate or Professional Degree 0.491 0.637 0.473 0.004 0.437 0.004
Male x Nonwhite ­0.339 0.467 ­0.343 0.002 ­0.360 0.002
Male x Race Missing 0.003 0.000 ­0.056 0.005 ­0.062 0.005
  Male x First Period Potential Experience <0 ­0.196 0.348 ­0.089 0.005 ­0.186 0.005
Female x Less Than High School ­0.222 0.000 ­0.188 0.007 ­0.236 0.004
Female x High School ­0.120 0.000 ­0.072 0.006 ­0.163 0.003
Female x Some College ­0.020 0.000 0.013 0.006 ­0.081 0.003
Female x Bachelor or Associate's Degree 0.146 0.000 0.162 0.006 0.063 0.003
Female x Graduate or Professional Degree 0.323 0.000 0.328 0.007 0.227 0.005
Female x Nonwhite ­0.131 0.000 ­0.122 0.002 ­0.130 0.002
Female x Race Missing ­0.009 0.000 ­0.033 0.007 ­0.038 0.007
Female x First Period Potential Experience <0 ­0.021 0.000 0.027 0.006 ­0.025 0.006
Intercept 10.00 0.000 9.71 0.004 9.86 0.003
Year Effects YES YES YES
HYBRID MIXED 
MODEL
Time­Varying Characteristics (
Male x Experience2 / 100
Male x Experience3 / 1000
Male x Experience4 / 10000
Female x Experience2 / 100
Female x Experience3 / 1000
Female x Experience4 / 10000
Time­Invariant Characteristics(
Notes: Fixed model estimates are based on the orthogonal match effects specification and estimated on the sample of all individuals employed in 
1997. Both mixed model specifications are estimated on the ten percent dense subsample. Time­varying coefficients in the hybrid mixed model are 
the same as the fixed model.
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FIGURE 2
Estimated Returns to Experience: Women
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TABLE 4
VARIANCE OF ESTIMATED COMPONENTS OF LOG EARNINGS
Match Effects Match Effects
Variance of Log Real Annualized Earnings (y) 0.422 0.410 0.410
0.031 0.017 0.029 0.027 0.017 0.017
0.274 0.273 0.258 0.189 0.269 0.198
0.043 0.041 0.038 0.036 0.041 0.039
0.232 0.233 0.220 0.153 0.228 0.159
0.065 0.066 0.158 0.104 0.158 0.102
0.022 0.079 0.079
0.066 0.040 0.052 0.036 0.052 0.036
<0.00001 <0.00001 <0.00001
0.867 0.919 0.894 0.933 0.894 0.933
Model Degrees of Freedom 32,022,609 27,798,909 3,652,501 3,652,500 3,652,501 3,652,500
FIXED MODEL* MIXED MODEL† HYBRID MIXED MODEL†
Person and 
Firm Effects
Orthogonal 
Match Effects
Person and 
Firm Effects
Person and 
Firm Effects
Variance of Time­Varying Covariates (X)
Variance of Pure Person Effect ()
Time­Invariant Covariates (U)
Unobserved Heterogeneity ()
Variance of Firm Effect ()
Variance of Match Effect ()
Error Variance ()
H0: No Match Effects (p­value)
R2
* Estimates are based on full sample of individuals employed in 1997.  Values in the table are sample variances of the estimated effects. The estimated error variance is corrected 
for degrees of freedom.
† Estimates are based on ten percent dense subsample of individuals employed in 1997.  For the rows labeled y, X U values in the table are sample variances. For the rows 
labeled values in the table are REML estimates of variance components.
TABLE 5
SAMPLE CORRELATIONS AMONG ESTIMATED EFFECTS
Person and Firm Effects Model
y   
Log Real Annualized Earnings (y) 1
0.25 1
0.79 ­0.06 1
0.36 0.02 0.39 1
0.71 ­0.08 0.92 0.00 1
0.41 0.07 0.00 0.08 ­0.03 1
y   
Log Real Annualized Earnings (y) 1
0.30 1
0.80 0.01 1
0.36 0.09 0.40 1
0.71 ­0.03 0.91 ­0.01 1
0.50 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.06 1
y   
Log Real Annualized Earnings (y) 1
0.25 1
0.83 0.04 1
0.40 0.22 0.41 1
0.72 ­0.05 0.91 ­0.01 1
0.49 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.05 1
Fixed Model*
X U
Time­Varying Covariates (X)
Pure Person Effect ()
Time­Invariant Covariates (U)
Unobserved Heterogeneity ()
Firm Effect ()
Mixed Model†
X U
Time­Varying Covariates (X)
Pure Person Effect ()
Time­Invariant Covariates (U)
Unobserved Heterogeneity ()
Firm Effect ()
Hybrid Mixed Model†
X U
Time­Varying Covariates (X)
Pure Person Effect ()
Time­Invariant Covariates (U)
Unobserved Heterogeneity ()
Firm Effect ()
* Estimates are based on full sample of individuals employed in 1997.
† Estimates are based on ten percent dense subsample of individuals employed in 1997.
TABLE 6
SAMPLE CORRELATIONS AMONG ESTIMATED EFFECTS
Match Effects Model
y    
Log Real Annualized Earnings (y) 1
0.25 1
0.81 0.02 1
0.38 0.14 0.39 1
0.72 ­0.04 0.92 0.00 1
0.41 0.08 0.01 0.09 ­0.03 1
0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1
y    
Log Real Annualized Earnings (y) 1
0.29 1
0.80 0.04 1
0.37 0.13 0.51 1
0.71 ­0.03 0.85 ­0.01 1
0.54 0.05 0.18 0.13 0.14 1
0.59 ­0.01 0.49 ­0.01 0.57 0.04 1
y    
Log Real Annualized Earnings (y) 1
0.25 1
0.82 0.08 1
0.40 0.24 0.51 1
0.71 ­0.05 0.85 ­0.01 1
0.54 0.04 0.19 0.13 0.14 1
0.60 ­0.04 0.49 ­0.01 0.57 0.04 1
Orthogonal Match Effects Model*
X U
Time­Varying Covariates (X)
Pure Person Effect ()
Time­Invariant Covariates (U)
Unobserved Heterogeneity ()
Firm Effect ()
Match Effect ()
Mixed Model†
X U
Time­Varying Covariates (X)
Pure Person Effect ()
Time­Invariant Covariates (U)
Unobserved Heterogeneity ()
Firm Effect ()
Match Effect ()
Hybrid Mixed Model†
X U
Time­Varying Covariates (X)
Pure Person Effect ()
Time­Invariant Covariates (U)
Unobserved Heterogeneity ()
Firm Effect ()
Match Effect ()
* Estimates are based on full sample of individuals employed in 1997.
† Estimates are based on ten percent dense subsample of individuals employed in 1997.
TABLE 7
DECOMPOSITION OF THE VARIANCE OF LOG EARNINGS
Match Effects Match Effects
Proportion of Variance of Log Earnings:
0.067 0.050 0.080 0.075 0.051 0.051
0.637 0.653 0.595 0.457 0.625 0.482
0.115 0.117 0.110 0.111 0.126 0.124
0.523 0.536 0.485 0.346 0.499 0.358
0.163 0.164 0.198 0.223 0.198 0.222
0.052 0.157 0.157
0.133 0.081 0.126 0.088 0.126 0.087
TOTAL 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
FIXED MODEL* MIXED MODEL† HYBRID MIXED MODEL†
Person and 
Firm Effects
Orthogonal 
Match Effects
Person and 
Firm Effects
Person and 
Firm Effects
Time­Varying Covariates (X)
Pure Person Effect ()
Time­Invariant Covariates (U)
Unobserved Heterogeneity ()
Firm Effect ()
Match Effect ()
Residual (e)
* Estimates are based on full sample of individuals employed in 1997.  
† Estimates are based on ten percent dense subsample of individuals employed in 1997.  
TABLE 8
DECOMPOSITION OF CHANGES IN LOG EARNINGS DUE TO JOB MOBILITY
Match Effects Match Effects
Mean Annual Change in Real Log Earnings 0.030 0.032 0.032
Mean Change in Log Earnings, All Job Transitions 0.045 0.049 0.049
Mean Change in Log Earnings, Job­to­Job Transitions 0.080 0.082 0.082
Proportion Attributed to (Job­to­Job Transitions):
0.395 0.410 0.391 0.401 0.415 0.415
0.316 0.305 0.395 0.405 0.373 0.390
0.329 0.183 0.185
0.289 ­0.044 0.215 0.011* 0.212 0.010*
TOTAL 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Total Number of Job Transitions 4,822,691 461,397 461,397
Number of Job­to­Job Transitions 2,233,456 213,763 213,763
FIXED MODEL‡ MIXED MODEL† HYBRID MIXED MODEL†
Person and 
Firm Effects
Orthogonal 
Match Effects
Person and 
Firm Effects
Person and 
Firm Effects
Time­Varying Covariates (X)
Firm Effect ()
Match Effect ()
Residual (e)
Asterisk (*) indicates estimate is not statisitically significant at the 5% level.
‡ Estimates are based on full sample of individuals employed in 1997.  
† Estimates are based on ten percent dense subsample of individuals employed in 1997.  
